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Abstract. Looking at today phishing panorama, we are able to iden-
tify two diametrically opposed approaches. On the one hand, massive
phishing targets as many people as possible with generic and preformed
texts. On the other hand, spear phishing targets high-value victims with
hand-crafted emails. While nowadays these two worlds partially inter-
sect, we envision a future where Natural Language Generation (NLG)
techniques will enable attackers to target populous communities with
machine-tailored emails. In this paper, we introduce what we call Com-
munity Targeted Phishing (CTP), alongside with some workflows that
exhibit how NLG techniques can craft such emails. Furthermore, we show
how Advanced NLG techniques could provide phishers new powerful
tools to bring up to the surface new information from complex data-
sets, and use such information to threaten victims’ private data.
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1 Introduction
Even though many years have passed since the Internet has come into our lives,
some of its atavistic problems still have to be addressed. Phishing is one of them,
and we foresee that its severity could even worsen in the coming years.
On the one hand, we have a massive phishing approach where attackers fill
simple templates with some basic information about the target, aiming to create
simple and sound emails with the minimum effort possible.
On the other hand, we have spear phishing emails where attackers experi-
enced in social-engineering techniques write articulate and specific emails. Even
though these emails are carefully forged and hard to detect, the creation process
requires such an effort that they are reserved only for high-level targets. Spear
phishing techniques are more and more popular into hackers’ toolboxes, as an
example they are essential to strike Advanced Persistence Threats (APTs) [6].
Although they have the same goal, until today these two worlds have been
somehow distinct from each other: massive production on one side, craftsmanship
on the other one. We envision a future where a middle ground will be prominent,
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thanks to sophisticated production processes that go under the name of Natural
Language Generation techniques, which will enable to target specific categories
with machine-tailored messages. We call this new approach to phishing Com-
munity Targeted Phishing (CTP), and we show in Figure 1 an example of this
evolution, as we foresee it.
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GLOBAL TARGETED COMMUNITY
Massive Phishing
The most popular, does not
require particular efforts but
still  somehow  efficient,  due
to  end  users'  lack  of
expertise.
Spear Phishing
One  of  the  most  efficient
hackers'  tools,  requires  a
huge  effort,  along  with
social engineering skills and
a  thorough  study  of  the
victim.
CTP
We foresee this as a popular
tool  in  the  future,  will
require  more  effort  than
massive  phishing  but  will
deliver higher success rates.
Popularity
Effort
Efficacy
Popularity
Effort
Efficacy
Fig. 1. Phishing naturally evolved from a massive approach to a manually hand-crafted
tool, used by hackers to target high value victims. We foresee a midway approach in
the future, which combines effectiveness and cheapness. Value bars present an estimate
of each characteristic, not actual statistic data.
To the best of our knowledge, at the time of writing only one recent work
about NLG applied to emails generation has been published [2]. In that work,
authors show that NLG-based emails can be extremely effective to deceive peo-
ple. Apart from such work, no other studies dig into how NLG fits into the big
picture, nor how smart partitioning the targets could dangerously combine with
NLG techniques. Strictly related, Natural Language Processing (NLP) goes in
the opposite direction of NLG by extracting information from written texts, and
it has been proposed as a solution to develop spam filters [8].
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a basic overview about
NLG and its core concepts, useful to read through this paper. Section 3 digs into
our predictions introducing our CTP concept with related workflows, in order to
clarify how Template-Filling NLG could enable attackers to target the victims
in the future. Then, Section 4 goes even further, making some hypothesis about
how Advanced NLG techniques could enable attackers to gain victims’ trust and
increase the success rate of their phishing attempts. Finally, Section 5 wraps up
our conclusive thoughts and lists some directions that we would like to take in
the future.
2 Natural Language Generation (NLG)
First of all, what do we talk about when we talk about Natural Language Gen-
eration? A simple definition is: “Natural language generation (NLG) systems
generate texts in English and other human languages” [5], yet this task is easier
said than done. As a matter of fact, NLG systems have to make quite a number
of different choices, in order to achieve the most suitable text for the specific pur-
pose. As an example, psycho-linguistic models of language comprehension show
that reflective pronouns usually improve a text readability and thus should be
normally used, but such pronouns should be usually avoided in safety-critical
texts, like operation manuals for nuclear power plants [5].
From a high-level perspective, NLG is traditionally divided in three macro-
categories, namely Canned Text, Template-Driven (or Template Filling), and
Advanced (or Proper) NLG. Canned Text is the most basic approach, where a
text is pre-generated (usually by a human being) and is used when the right
moment comes. Even though different texts can be merged with some glue texts,
this technique is hardly flexible and unable to adapt even to little domain vari-
ations. As previously pointed out [7], “Canned text is the borderline case of a
template without gaps”.
Talking about Template-Driven, this approach consists into defining some
templates that exhibit gaps, to be filled with the correct information gathered
from an external source, such as a database. The third approach, the Advanced
NLG, is sometimes called proper NLG to highlight the fact that a NLG sys-
tem implies a large variety of choices, and the two aforementioned approaches
oversimplify the matter by using preformed texts. In particular, some authors
argue that Template-Driven approaches are not proper NLG and tend to dismiss
them, while others affirm that Template-Driven systems have been so much re-
fined through the years that the distinction between them and pure NLG is too
blurred to hold, nowadays [7].
No matter what kind of approach is chosen, even though NLG systems are
far from being widespread, they have been used in many applications. One of the
classic examples are weather forecasts, which are automatically generated from
meaningful database entries; other fields implemented NLG in their routines,
such as soccer, financial, technical, and scientific automatic reports.
3 Aiming at Groups: Community Targeted Phishing
(CTP)
What massive phishing lacks is a deeper comprehension about recipients’ rela-
tionships, characteristic which is totally neglected nowadays. Yet, dividing users
in meaningful subsets could help phishers to impersonate some group members,
and attack the others, in a much more effective way. This is not done yet, mostly
because traditional phishing is still effective, but spam filters are proving them-
selves more and more reliable [1] [3]. One popular approach to develop such
filters, is to apply the Bayesian filtering. In order to discern a legitimate email
from a malicious one, this process checks every single word against a table, which
contains the most commonly used words in spam emails. Even though advanced
adversarial machine learning techniques can be used to poison the whole pro-
cess [4], this approach is effective.
Such filters require training and leverage the strong points of phishing, which
are massiveness and repetitiveness, to get statistically meaningful data. If phish-
ers could smartly divide this huge user blob in smart subsets, they could forge
more complex emails and deprive Bayesian spam filters of the aforementioned vi-
tal statistical data. We call this approach Community Targeted Phishing (CTP),
and in the following subsection we provide some examples on how it could be
applied.
3.1 Case Study: Scientific Community
One community which we are familiar with is the scientific one. As a matter of
fact, researchers working in the same research field mostly share many interests
and know quite a number of colleagues. Furthermore, the email exchange for
collaborations, sharing of ideas and call for papers are the routine. On the av-
erage, if computer science researchers are enough knowledgeable about security
and spam, members of other scientific fields usually exhibit very basic computer
skills, which makes them easy targets for malicious attackers.
Scientists already receive a lot of scam emails from shady conferences and
journals, which name resembles a legitimate venue and invite the recipients to
submit their work. Sometimes people willingly submit to pay-for-publish venues,
some other times they are fooled into believing that they are actually submitting
to an honest venue. But these phishing emails are really simple in their form,
as attackers just fill the first line with something along the line of “Dear Prof.
Smith” without any kind of variation in the preformed text and without trying
to impersonate an actual researcher. Furthermore, in many cases the attackers
even fail to parse correctly the title, as it often happens for PhD Students to be
addressed as Dr., Prof., or similarly wrong titles. Succeeding into impersonate
a real person through an automated process, on the other hand, is a far more
serious (and hard to achieve) threat and this is what we address in our paper.
As a case study, we propose a mechanism that fills two proposed templates
by utilizing Template-Driven NLG techniques, and the related workflows that
show how the whole email forging process could take place. As a matter of
fact, we believe that even such basic templates could successfully fool a good
number of people. The main problem that we see with this approach is that
it still requires some human effort, to understand how a community usually
interacts and what subsets should be excluded or included into the attack. As
an example, in Subsection 3.1 we will see that targeting very close colleagues
with that particular template should be avoided.
Template 1 The first proposal takes advantage of the fact that researchers
know many names in their field, but the relationships tend to be very weak.
Yet, networking is an important part in scientists’ lives, therefore a proposal
from a respected name in the field could be an easy lure for a young researcher.
The template is: “Dear [Colleague Name], I’ve read your recent work entitled
[Manuscript Title] and I found it quite interesting. I’ve come up with some ideas
about that same topic and I would be enthusiastic to work with you on this. At
[Fake Google Drive Link] you will find a brief recap about my insights. Hope
to hear from you soon, best regards [Scholar Name]”. As before, the link will
redirect the user to a fake login page which resembles Google login page. Figure 2
shows the workflow to produce the proposed text.
Fig. 2. Workflow of Template-driven NLG applied to Template 1.
Template 2 The second approach is riskier because the attacker has to imper-
sonate someone close to the victim. A forged email could sound way too formal
(e.g., nicknames are normally used between acquaintances), but it could pay
since colleagues often read privately each others’ works, as a form of preliminary
peer-review. The template is: “Hi [Colleague Name], as you know I’m working
on [Topic Name] and I’ve written the attached paper. I would like to have some
suggestions from you about it, since I’m a little uncertain about the solidity of
the whole work. At [Fake Google Drive Link] you will find my draft. Thanks so
much in advance, see you soon [Scholar Name]”. As before, the link will redirect
the user to a fake login page which resembles Google login page. Figure 3 shows
the workflow to produce the proposed text.
Fig. 3. Workflow of Template-driven NLG applied to Template 2.
4 Advanced NLG
In this section, we take one step more in our predictions and depict a scenario
where Advanced NLG is used to create more convincing phishing emails.
As an example, an attacker could parse Google Scholar and look for re-
searchers’ h-index trend during the past 5 years and their performance with
respect to their colleagues in the same field. With such data, the attacker could
use NLG techniques to summarize the trends in a natural language and incor-
porate this new information in a phishing email. The result would be something
along the line of “Dear [Target Name], I am Prof. [Reputable Name] from [Rep-
utable University], we are currently expanding our lab and we are evaluating
some possible candidates. I have personally checked your Google Scholar ac-
count and noticed that you h-index is high with respect of the average in your
field, and considerably grew over the last 5-years span. Therefore, we would like
to propose you a position. You can enrol at the following link: [Phishing Link]”.
If the victim is successfully tricked, they might fill the recruitment form and give
up valuable information to the attacker.
Besides the research community, similar techniques could be applied to social
network users. For example, an attacker could use NLG techniques to identify
and summarize a specific interest of a social network account and forward a
private message along the line of: “Hello [Victim], I’ve seen that you’re really
into [Music Genre]. I’m an event organizer and I would like to inform you that the
next weekend, at the [Big Square] in [Victim Hometown], [Good Music Player]
will give a short exhibition. All the details in the following link, feel free to
attend! [Phishing Link]”. The phishing link would be a fake login page which
mimics the social network one, created by the attacker. If the victim believes
that a disconnection due to technical issues happened, they might try to login
again, which would result in stolen credentials.
Despite the very simplistic nature of the aforementioned examples, the ca-
pability of translating heterogeneous information into natural language text can
play a huge part in the next future of automatic phishing generation. Indeed,
through Advanced NLG techniques attackers do much more than creating auto-
matic text: they pinpoint submerged information which would take a huge effort
to manually discover.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, firstly we have given a brief overview about the concept of Natural
Language Generation (NLG) techniques and how these could be used to forge
phishing emails. Moreover, we have expressed our concerns about how NLG could
help hackers to easily target a community, such as the scientific one, proposing
the concept of Community Targeted Phishing (CTP). We have provided two
workflows that show how a Template-driven approach could be used to create
phishing messages, and then we analysed how Advanced NLG techniques could
enable phishers to achieve complex (thus, harder to spot) emails.
Future works will investigate different NLG techniques, in order to under-
stand which ones provide the best results in terms of credibility and effective-
ness. Moreover, we would like to investigate the variety that Advanced NLG
techniques can ensure in text generation, as suggested in Section 4, and evaluate
how traditional Bayesian spam filters perform against such phishing texts.
This work is just a first step, useful to introduce the very concept of CTP and
raise awareness about a problem that might soon show up. We believe that using
a NLG approach to target people with similar interests could be worthwhile,
since it would allow to create emails more effective than the general ones, and
cheaper than the spear phishing ones.
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